Self-Determination of Peoples in the Charter of the United Nations by Kilian, Petr
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD)	11(3):341-353,	setembro-dezembro	2019	Unisinos	-	doi:	10.4013/rechtd.2019.113.03	
	
	
Este	é	um	artigo	de	acesso	aberto,	licenciado	por	Creative	Commons	Atribuição	4.0	Internacional	(CC	BY	4.0),	sendo	permitidas	reprodução,	adaptação	e	distribuição	desde	que	o	autor	e	a	fonte	originais	sejam	creditados.	
	
	
	
Self-Determination	of	Peoples	in	the	Charter	of	the	
United	Nations		
	
Autodeterminação	dos	povos	na	Carta	das	Nações	Unidas	
	
	
Petr	Kilian1	Masaryk	University	(República	Tcheca)	petrkilian@gmail.com	
		
Resumo		Este	 ensaio	 analisa	 o	 princípio	 da	 autodeterminação	 dos	 povos	 contido	 na	Carta	das	Nações	Unidas.	Usando	os	métodos	 tradicionais	de	 interpretação	de	 tratados,	 argumenta	 que	 a	 Carta,	 por	 si	 só,	 não	 garante	 o	 direito	 à	autodeterminação	 de	 entidades	 específicas	 de	 uma	 maneira	 particular.	 A	Carta	 apenas	 consagra	 um	 princípio	 jurídico	 que	 posteriormente	 foi	traduzido	 em	 normas	 específicas	 por	 tratados	 sucessivos	 e	 pelo	 direito	consuetudinário.	 Por	 outro	 lado,	 a	 Carta	 não	 limita	 o	 escopo	 da	autodeterminação	ao	contexto	colonial	ou	a	populações	 inteiras	de	Estados	soberanos.	 Portanto,	 e	 como	 o	 princípio	 não	 implica	 independência,	 a	autodeterminação	 poderia	 muito	 bem	 ser	 aplicada	 a	 vários	 grupos	 não	estatais,	como	já	aconteceu	no	caso	dos	povos	indígenas.	
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Abstract	This	 essay	 analyses	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples	 as	contained	 in	 the	 Charter	 of	 the	 United	 Nations.	 Using	 the	 traditional	methods	of	 treaty	 interpretation,	 it	 argues	 that	 the	Charter	does	not	 in	itself	 guarantee	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 of	 specific	 entities	 in	 a	particular	way.	The	Charter	merely	 enshrines	 a	 legal	 principle	 that	has	subsequently	been	translated	into	particular	norms	by	successive	treaties	and	 customary	 law.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Charter	 does	 not	 limit	 the	scope	 of	 self-determination	 to	 the	 colonial	 context	 or	 to	 entire	populations	of	 sovereign	states.	Therefore,	 and	since	 the	principle	does	
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not	 imply	 independence,	 self-determination	 could	 well	 be	 applied	 to	various	 non-state	 groups,	 as	 has	 already	 happened	 in	 the	 case	 of	indigenous	peoples.	
Keywords:	Self-Determination,	People,	Charter	of	the	United	Nations.		 	
Introduction		 Peoples	have	the	right	to	self-determination.	A	principle	invoked	by	the	winners	of	both	world	wars	when	considering	the	post-war	arrangement	of	the	world	(Wilson	and	Shaw,	1918;	Atlantic	Charter,	1941).	A	principle	that	contributed	to	the	collapse	of	colonies	(UNGA	Resolution	1514).	A	principle	behind	the	bloodiest	European	war	conflict	 in	 the	second	half	of	 the	twentieth	century	(Detrez,	 2003).	 And	 recently	 also	 a	 principle	 associated	 with	 the	 rights	 of	 indigenous	 peoples	(UNGA	Resolution	61/295).	There	 is	 no	 doubt	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples	 in	international	 law.	 It	 is	enshrined	in	 international	treaties	and	other	documents	and	is	taken	into	account	 by	 states	 in	 both	 international	 relations	 and	 national	 matters.	 It	 is	 also	 dealt	 with	 by	international	tribunals	and	academic	texts.	Yet	the	subject	of	self-determination	of	peoples	is	one	of	the	most	controversial	ones.	In	 the	 first	 place,	 this	 is	 because	 it	 contains	 two	 vague	 terms:	 “self-determination”	 and	“people”.	 This	 alone	 may	 not	 be	 an	 insurmountable	 obstacle;	 after	 all,	 lawyers	 are	 commonly	confronted	with	vague	terms	and	deal	with	them	using	traditional	interpretation	methods.	In	the	case	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples,	 however,	 the	 situation	 is	 more	 difficult	because	 the	 principle	 has	 become	 part	 of	 international	 law	without	 a	 general	 consensus	 on	 its	meaning.	 It	 can	 even	 be	 said	 that	 self-determination	 has	 become	 part	 of	 international	 law	 not	despite	its	uncertainty	but	thanks	to	it	because	it	has	always	allowed	interpretations	that	limit	the	interests	of	states	concerned	as	least	as	possible.	It	is	not	surprising,	therefore,	that	international	treaties	 and	 other	 instruments	 that	 enshrine	 the	 right	 of	 peoples	 to	 self-determination	 do	 not	contain	any	definition	of	‘people’	and	merely	elaborate	on	what	self-determination	means.	The	practice	of	states	is	not	much	better.	It	is	quite	clear	in	the	colonial	context2	or	in	the	case	of	occupied	territories	(International	Court	of	Justice,	2004,	paras.	115	et	seq.).	However,	in	relation	to	the	right	to	self-determination	of	the	population	(or	part	of	it)	of	a	sovereign	state,	states	are	far	less	consistent.		
Self-Determination	of	Peoples	and	the	Role	of	United	Nations		 In	 2008,	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (hereinafter	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “Court”)	was	asked	by	the	UN	General	Assembly	to	assess	whether	the	declaration	of	independence	by	Kosovo	representatives	 was	 in	 accordance	 with	 international	 law,	 which	 provided	 an	 exceptional	opportunity	 for	states	 to	present	 their	 interpretation	of	 the	right	 to	self-determination	 in	a	non-colonial	 context	 (although	 the	Opinion	 itself	 avoided	 interpretation	of	 self-determination;	 paras.	82-83).	A	look	at	the	various	submissions	sent	to	the	Court	by	various	states	showed	an	incredible	
																																								 																				2	The	International	Court	of	Justice	defines	colonies	as	territories	“geographically	separated	and	ethnically	or	culturally	different”	from	 the	 countries	 that	 govern	 them.	 This	 mainly	 applies	 to	 territories	 as	 defined	 in	 Chapters	 XI	 and	 XII	 of	 the	 UN	Charter	(International	Court	of	Justice,	2019,	para.	156).	
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fragmentation	 of	 opinions.3	Different	 attitudes	were	 held	 not	 only	with	 respect	 to	what	 follows	from	the	right	to	self-determination	but	also	with	respect	to	who	can	enjoy	that	right.		For	example,	China,	Romania,	Serbia,	Cyprus,	Argentina	and,	 to	some	extent,	Bolivia	and	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	stated	that	Kosovo	did	not	have	the	right	to	self-determination.	In	contrast,	Switzerland,	Finland,	Slovenia,	Ireland,	Denmark,	Maldives,	Egypt,	Germany,	Poland,	Estonia,	Latvia,	Albania	and	the	Netherlands	were	of	the	opposite	opinion	(and	even	 these	 countries	 did	 not	 agree	 on	 particulars).	 Russia,	 Slovakia,	 Spain	 and	 Japan	 openly	admitted	 that	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Kosovo	was	questionable.	The	divergence	of	views	on	the	right	to	self-determination	was	reflected	in	the	Opinion	itself	and	 in	 the	 separate	opinions	of	 the	Court’s	 judges.	As	 the	Court	pointed	out,	 “radically	different	views”	were	expressed	with	respect	to	the	question	whether	the	right	to	self-determination	confers	upon	part	of	the	population	of	an	existing	state	a	right	to	separate	from	that	state	(para.	82).	Judge	Cançado	Trindade	has	stated	in	this	respect	that	the	meaning	of	the	term	“people”	in	the	context	of	the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 several	 debates	 that	 have	 not	 lead	 to	unambiguous	conclusions.4	Judge	Yusuf	criticised	the	Court	for	missing	the	opportunity	to	interpret	the	right	to	self-determination	and	thereby	prevent	many	disputes	around	the	world	(para.	17).	Every	case	is	unique	and	it	is	precisely	the	specificity	of	Kosovo	that	many	states	have	pointed	out.	Law,	however,	does	not	operate	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	The	differences	in	the	interpretation	of	law	and	 its	application	 to	a	particular	case	are	natural.	However,	 in	 the	case	of	 the	right	 to	self-determination—as	presented	in	the	above-mentioned	written	opinions—one	can	no	longer	speak	about	an	ordinary	dispute	about	law	but	almost	about	chaos.	This	 leads	 the	 author	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 subject	 the	principle	 of	 self-determination	to	new	examination,	focusing	gradually	on	its	original	enshrinement	in	international	law	 and	 on	 the	 subsequent	 development.	 This	 examination	 should	 not	 be	 based	 on	 political	 or	other	 considerations	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 but	strictly	on	the	relevant	(especially	primary)	sources	of	international	law	as	enshrined	in	Art.	38	(1)	of	the	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice.5		The	author	considers	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	to	be	a	starting	point,	which	integrated	this	principle,	previously	merely	political,6	into	its	Art.	1	(2).7	It	was	precisely	the	principle	of	self-determination	 as	 contained	 in	 the	 Charter	 that	 was	 subsequently	 followed	 by	 state	 practice,	including	 international	 treaties.8	 The	 primary	 and	 crucial	 question	 for	 this	 article	 is	 what	 the	Charter	actually	enshrined.	Its	clarification	will	make	it	possible	to	follow	up	with	further	research,	focused	especially	on	customary	law	as	it	developed	based	on	the	Charter	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	and	early	twenty-first	centuries.		
																																								 																				3	All	written	submissions	are	available	at	ICJ-cij.org.		4		Trindade	even	asked	all	the	“parties	to	the	proceedings”	a	question	in	this	regard,	i.e.,	what	preconditions	have	to	be	met	for	a	certain	entity	to	be	considered	people	in	the	meaning	of	the	right	of	the	peoples	to	self-determination	(para.	225).	5		Strictly	speaking,	Art.	38	merely	lists	the	sources	the	Court	should	work	with.	However,	it	is	clear	from	the	nature	of	the	matter	(pursuant	to	the	same	provision,	 the	Court’s	 function	 is	 to	“decide	 in	accordance	with	 international	 law”)	 that	Art.	38	(1)	of	 the	Statute	lists	all	the	relevant	sources	of	international	law	(Shaw,	2008,	pp.	70–71).	6	 For	 the	 pre-war	 analysis	 of	 the	 principle	 see	 the	 Report	 presented	 in	 1921	 to	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	 by	 the	Commission	of	Rapporteurs.	7	 And	 also	 into	 Art.	55,	which,	 however,	 adopts	 the	 terminology	 of	 Art.	1	(2)	 and	 does	 not	 bring	 any	 added	 value	 in	 terms	 of	interpretation.	The	analysis	will,	therefore,	focus	primarily	on	Art.	1	(2).	8		For	example,	common	Art.	1	of	the	International	Covenants	on	Human	Rights,	which	expressly	contains	the	right	of	all	peoples	to	self-determination,	was	 integrated	 in	 the	 texts	of	both	 treaties	 in	accordance	with	General	Assembly	Resolution	545	(VI)	of	5	February	1952,	 which	 called	 upon	 guaranteeing	 the	 right	 of	 peoples	 to	 self-determination	 “in	 reaffirmation	 of	 the	 principle	
enunciated	in	the	Charter”.	The	principle	of	self-determination	as	defined	in	the	Charter	is	similarly	invoked	in	the	Preamble	of	the	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	adopted	by	General	Assembly	Resolution	61/295	of	13	December	2007.	
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Art.	1	(2)	of	the	Charter	reads	as	follows.	
	 The	Purposes	of	the	United	Nations	are:		2.	To	develop	friendly	relations	among	nations	based	on	respect	for	the	principle	of	equal	 rights	 and	 self-determination	 of	 peoples,	 and	 to	 take	 other	 appropriate	measures	to	strengthen	universal	peace;		The	 UN	Charter	 is	 an	 international	 treaty	 and	 as	 such	 must	 be	 interpreted	 by	 means	 of	traditional	 methods	 codified	 in	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	 Treaties	 (“Vienna	Convention”;	 cf.	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 1962,	 p.	 157).	 Pursuant	 to	 Art.	4,	 the	 Vienna	Convention	applies	only	to	treaties	concluded	between	states	after	it	has	entered	into	force	with	respect	of	them,	however,	a	significant	part	of	it	constitutes	codification	of	existing	customary	law	(International	Court	of	Justice,	1997,	para.	46),	which	also	applies	specifically	to	Art.	31	through	33	dealing	with	interpretation	of	international	treaties	(International	Court	of	Justice,	1994,	para.	41).	Therefore,	 interpretative	 rules	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 are	 applicable,	 and	 when	references	are	made	to	specific	articles	of	the	Vienna	Convention,	this	is	done	for	the	sake	of	clarity,	and	the	customary	law	codified	therein	is	meant.		Art.	31	 (1)	 of	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 gives	 primacy	 to	 grammatical	 interpretation	 of	international	 treaties,	 which	 is	 also	 consistent	 with	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	Justice,	 according	 to	 which	 other	 methods	 of	 interpretation	 should	 be	 used	 if	 grammatical	interpretation	 would	 lead	 to	 ambiguous	 or	 pointless	 conclusions	 (1991,	 para.	 48).	 However,	grammatical	interpretation	alone	will	not	suffice	in	the	case	of	self-determination	of	peoples	under	Art.	1	(2)	 of	 the	 Charter.	 Primarily,	 it	 is	 difficult	 because	 of	 vague	 terminology.	 Moreover,	 the	Charter	 has	 five	 authentic	 language	 versions,9	 which	 differ	 from	 each	 other	 more	 than	 would	necessarily	arise	from	the	nature	of	different	languages.	Inevitably,	more	“sophisticated”	methods	of	interpretation	will	have	to	be	adopted.	These	also	serve	as	the	basis	for	three	conclusions.	First,	the	 Charter	 does	 not	 in	 itself	 guarantee	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 of	 specific	 entities	 in	 a	particular	way	but	merely	enshrines	a	principle	that	has	been	translated	into	particular	norms	by	successive	 treaties	 and	 customary	 law.	 Second,	 the	 principle	 enshrined	 in	 the	 Charter	 was	 not	limited	 to	 the	 colonial	 context	 or	 to	 the	 entire	 population	 of	 sovereign	 states.	 Third,	 self-determination	under	the	Charter	did	not	mean	independence.	The	first	conclusion	is	clear	from	the	very	text	and	the	systematic	inclusion	of	Art.	1	(2).	Art.	1	of	the	Charter	lists	the	objectives	of	the	United	Nations,	while	paragraph	2	does	not	even	focus	on	self-determination	as	it	primarily	deals	with	developing	friendly	relations	among	nations.	Such	 relations	 should	 be	 based	 on	 respect	 for	 equal	 rights	 and	 peoples’	 self-determination.	Therefore,	self-determination	is	not	even	present	in	Art.	1	as	an	independent	value	but	merely	as	 a	 means	 of	 achieving	 another	 value	 (friendly	 relations	 among	 nations).	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	imagine	 that	 the	 parties	 would	 intend	 to	 establish	 in	 this	 way	 a	 specific	 right	 of	 specific	entities,	especially	when	the	only	other	reference	to	self-determination	is	in	Art.	55,	again	as	a	prerequisite	 for	 friendly	 relations	 among	 nations.	 Moreover,	 self-determination	 is	 not	 even	mentioned	in	Art.	2,	which	lays	down	the	guiding	principles	according	to	which	the	organization	and	 its	members	are	to	act.	Some	authors	state	that	 the	principles	mentioned	 in	Art.	1	are	more	aspirational	 than	 those	enshrined	 in	Art.	2,	which	are	 the	 cornerstones	of	 the	 functioning	of	 the	organization	(Paulus,	2012,	pp.	127–128).	However,	the	distinction	based	on	fact	in	which	of	the	first	two	articles	the	principles	have	been	included	cannot	be	overestimated.	As	is	clear	from	the	San	Francisco	Conference,10	the	decision	whether	the	principles	should	be	included	in	Art.	1,	Art.	2	
																																								 																				9	Art.	111	of	the	Charter.	10	During	which	the	Charter	was	being	prepared.	
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or	even	in	the	Preamble	to	the	Charter	did	not	appear	to	be	crucial	and	was	not	based	on	criteria	that	could	be	clearly	grasped	(Cristescu,	1981,	p.	21	et	seq.).	In	any	case,	it	is	inevitable	to	insist	on	the	conclusion	that	self-determination	of	peoples	in	the	Charter	 is	 merely	 a	 legal	 principle	 that	 should	 be	 further	 specified	 by	 the	 activities	 of	 the	organization	bodies	and	its	members.	This	is	also	confirmed	by	information	from	the	preparatory	works.	It	shows	that	initially,	self-determination	of	peoples	was	not	to	appear	in	the	Charter	at	all,	which	 changed	 only	 at	 the	 insistence	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 (Cassese,	 1995,	 p.	 38).	 Some	 states	continued	 to	 demand	 that	 it	 be	 removed	 because	 of	 its	 ambiguity,	 but	 the	 principle	 ultimately	remained	 in	 the	 final	 text;	however,	without	 further	 specification	or	 finding	a	 certain	consensus	over	what	it	should	express.	As	the	San	Francisco	conference	report	says,	“states	were	unable	to	
positively	define	 self-determination”.	Allegedly,	 it	was	only	agreed	that	self-determination	under	Art.	1	(2)	did	not	mean	the	right	of	minorities	and	ethnic	groups	to	separate	from	a	sovereign	state,	the	right	of	colonies	to	gain	independence,	or	the	right	of	residents	of	a	sovereign	state	to	choose	their	 rulers	 through	 regular,	 democratic	 and	 free	 elections	 (Cassese,	 1995,	 p.	 42).	 If	 it	 was	ultimately	agreed	to	retain	the	mention	of	the	principle	of	self-determination	in	the	Charter	without	having	 reached	agreement	on	 its	 contents,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 it	was	done	so	with	 the	knowledge	of	absence	of	particular	rights	arising	out	of	it.		For	these	reasons,	the	author	considers	irrelevant	the	difference	between	the	English	version	(and	also,	for	example,	the	Spanish	version)	and	the	French	version	consisting	in	the	fact	that	while	the	English	version	does	not	present	self-determination	of	peoples	as	a	right	(“…based	on	respect	
for	the	principle	of	equal	rights	and	self-determination	of	peoples…”),	the	French	version	does	when	stipulating	the	principle	of	right	 to	self-determination	(“…sur	 le	respect	du	principe	de	 l'égalité	de	
droits	 des	peuples	 et	 de	 leur	droit	 à	 disposer	d'eux-mêmes…”).	The	use	of	 the	word	 “right”	 in	 the	French	version	does	not	in	any	way	alter	the	nature	and	meaning	of	Art.	1	(2)	of	the	Charter	and	the	principle	of	self-determination	enshrined	therein.	As	 regards	 the	 second	and	 third	 conclusions	 referred	 to	above,	under	Art.	31	 (1)	of	 the	Vienna	 Convention,	 terms	 in	 a	 treaty	 are	 given	 their	 ordinary	meaning.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	here	that	there	are	significant	differences	in	the	use	of	terms	between	the	English	and	French	versions.	 Not	 only	 are	 these	 versions	 authentic,	 but	 English	 and	 French	were	 (unlike	 other	authentic	 versions)	 working	 languages	 at	 the	 San	 Francisco	 conference	 (Kotzur,	 2012,	 p.	2257).	The	author	has	 chosen	 the	English	version,	which	 is	more	 similar	 to	other	authentic	versions,	 as	 the	 default	 one	 for	 this	 article.	 However,	 he	 subsequently	 confronts	 his	conclusions	with	the	French	version,	applying	Art.	33	of	the	Vienna	Convention.	The	English	version	stipulates	“self-determination	of	peoples”.	Let	us	start	with	the	self-determining	unit,	 i.e.,	people.	A	 look	 in	dictionaries	 from	the	period	prior	 to	 the	adoption	of	the	 Charter	 will	 reveal	 that	 the	 word	 “people”	 does	 not	 have	 one	 ordinary	 meaning,	 as	referred	to	in	Art.	31	(1)	of	the	Vienna	Convention,	that	could	be	said	to	have	been	meant	by	the	parties.	 In	common	English,	of	 course,	 it	 is	most	commonly	used	as	a	plural	of	 “person”	and	 simply	 means	 “persons”	 (Collins	 Dictionary,	 “people”).	 However	 the	 Charter	 uses	 the	plural	form	“peoples”,	which	is	the	plural	of	“people”	as	a	plural-only	noun.	According	to	the	second	 edition	 of	 Black’s	 Law	Dictionary	 (focused	 on	 American	 English)	 of	 1910,	 the	word	“people”	 had	 a	 number	 of	 meanings,	 such	 as	 “state”	 or	 “nation”.	 In	 constitutional	 law,	 it	typically	meant	 all	 citizens/residents	of	 a	 state	or	nation	gifted	with	political	power,	 i.e.,	 all	voters	 (The	 Law	 Dictionary,	 “people”).	 In	 the	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary—which	 contains	records	of	the	use	of	individual	words	over	many	centuries—the	list	of	possible	meanings	is	even	 broader,	 also	 containing	 all	 citizens	 of	 one	 state	 as	 a	 source	 of	 political	 power;	 the	meanings	 also	 included	 nation,	 race	 or	 ethnicity	 (Oxford	 English	 Dictionary,	 “people”).	 The	meanings	 in	 the	 web	 version	 of	 the	 Merriam-Webster	 dictionary,	 for	 which	 there	 is	 no	
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identifiable	time	at	which	the	word	was	used	in	the	present	meaning,	include,	for	example,	all	voters	in	a	state	or	a	body	of	persons	that	are	united	by	a	common	culture,	tradition,	or	sense	of	 kinship,	 that	 typically	 have	 common	 language,	 institutions,	 and	 beliefs,	 and	 that	 often	constitute	a	politically	organized	group	(Merriam-Webster,	“people”).	A	 look	 at	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	 Charter	 shows	 that	 “nation”	 and	 “state”	 are	 used	 in	addition	 to	 “people”,	 sometimes	 even	 in	 the	 same	 sentence.	Therefore,	 it	 should	a	priori	 be	assumed	 that	 these	 words	 have	 different	 meanings	 (Scalia	 and	 Garner,	 2002,	 p.	 170).	 The	word	 “people”	 has	 a	 total	 of	 thirteen	 mentions	 in	 the	 Charter,11	 in	 various,	 at	 first	 glance	unrelated	provisions.	For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 introductory	sentence	of	 the	Preamble,	which	starts	with	 the	words	 “we	 the	 peoples	 of	 the	 United	Nations”.	 In	 the	 Preamble,	 “people”	 is	used	 once	 more	 in	 the	 context	 of	 promoting	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 advancement	 of	 all	peoples.	 In	nine	cases,	 “people”	 is	used	 in	provisions	applicable	 to	colonies	and,	 finally,	 two	cases	of	use	are	the	currently	discussed	Art.	1	(2)	and	Art.	55.		The	word	“state”	is	used	much	more	frequently	in	the	Charter	and	there	are	no	disputes	over	 its	 meaning,	 it	 is	 a	 traditional	 subject	 of	 international	 law	 that	 has	 a	 permanent	population,	government	and	territory,	and	the	ability	to	enter	 into	diplomatic	relations	with	other	states.12	Nor	is	there	any	major	controversy	that	there	are	obvious	differences	between	the	 concepts	 of	 “state”	 and	 “people”.	 More	 problematic	 is	 the	 word	 “nation”	 and	 its	differentiation	 from	the	other	 two	 terms.	At	 first	glance,	 “nation”	 is	used	most	 frequently	 in	the	Charter.	A	closer	examination,	however,	reveals	that	these	are	mostly	situations	where	the	organization	is	mentioned	as	such.	The	word	“nation”	is	used	in	a	different	context	only	in	the	Preamble	 (which	 expresses	 belief	 in	 the	 equal	 rights	 of	 nations	 large	 and	 small),	 in	 Art.	1	(enshrining	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 organization)	 or	 in	 the	 phrase	 “friendly	 relations	 among	nations”	 (in	Art.	1,	Art.	14	and	Art.	55).	The	 term	“nation”	generally	has	a	different	meaning	than	 “state”,	 for	 example	 in	 that	 it	 captures	 a	 certain	 “living”	 element	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	concept	of	“state”,	which	is	a	legal	construction.	According	to	the	aforementioned	Black’s	Law	Dictionary,	it	is	an	organized	people	inhabiting	a	distinct	portion	of	the	earth,	using	the	same	customs,	 possessing	 historic	 continuity,	 and	 generally,	 but	 not	 necessarily,	 living	 under	 the	same	 government	 and	 sovereignty	 (The	 Law	Dictionary,	 “nation”).	Here,	 therefore,	 it	might	seem	to	be	a	subset	of	“people”,	which	does	not,	however,	clearly	explain	why	the	word	was	used	 at	 all,	 since	 surely	 if	 it	 was	 only	 a	 subset,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 organization	 would	 be	friendship	among	all	peoples,	not	only	nations.	Another	problem	with	the	term	“nation”	is	that	it	 should	 be	 different	 from	 “state”	 but	 the	 organization	 is	 called	 “the	 United	 Nations”,	 and	according	 to	 Art.	3	 and	 4,	 only	 states	 can	 be	members.13	 The	 explanation	 could	 be	 that	 the	organization	unites	 nations	 through	 states	 as	 their	 international	 representatives.	Moreover,	there	 are	 other	 than	 (only)	 linguistic	 requirements	 for	 names.	 Also	 important	 is	 certain	symbolism	(in	 this	case	 the	name	 follows	up	on	 the	name	of	 the	winning	coalition	 from	the	WWII)	 or	 unmistakeability	 (hence	 the	 name	 “the	 United	 States”	 would	 be	 unfit).	 This,	however,	does	not	eliminate	other	ambiguities.		States	 pointed	 out	 these	 shortcomings	 during	 the	 San	 Francisco	 Conference.	 Their	representatives	argued	that	the	term	“nation”	was	confusing	and	legally	incorrect	since	only	states	are	subjects	of	international	relations,	that	the	use	of	the	terms	“nation”	and	“people”	in	a	single	sentence	indicates	the	possibility	of	separation,	or	that	the	terms	“nation”	and	“state”	are	used	interchangeably	in	some	countries,	whereas	in	Europe	there	is	a	difference	between	
																																								 																				11	However,	once—in	Art.	83	(2)—as	a	plural	of	“person”.	12	 These	 criteria	 correspond	 to	 those	 agreed	 by	 the	 Montevideo	 Convention	 on	 the	 Rights	 and	 Duties	 of	 States	(26	December	1933).	13	On	the	other	hand,	some	original	members	did	not	meet	the	criteria	of	statehood	pursuant	to	Art.	3	(Fastenrath,	2012,	p.	337).		
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them	 (Cristescu,	 1981,	 p.	 38).	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 Coordinating	 Committee	was	 asked	 to	report	on	 the	use	of	 the	 terms	 in	 the	draft	Charter.	 Its	 report	 shows	 that	 the	meaning	each	word	has	was	far	from	being	the	only	criterion	for	its	use.	As	 regards	 the	word	 “state”,	 the	 Committee	 stated	 the	 aforementioned,	 i.e.,	 that	 it	 was	used	in	a	clear	and	irreplaceable	sense	for	a	subject	of	international	law	meeting	the	criteria	of	 statehood.	 According	 to	 the	 Committee,	 “nation”	 is	 most	 often	 used	 in	 the	 Charter	 in	 a	broad	 and	 non-political	 sense,	 in	 which	 it	 is	 more	 suitable	 than	 the	 word	 “state”	 since	 it	includes,	 in	 addition	 to	 states,	 also	 colonies,	 mandated	 territories,	 quasi-states	 and	 others.	Moreover,	 it	 allegedly	 has	 a	 “poetic	 flavour”,	 which	 the	 word	 “state”	 lacks.	 Finally,	 the	Committee	 identified	 the	 concept	 of	 “people”	 as	 problem-free.	 It	 is	 used	 whenever	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 express	 the	 idea	 of	 all	 humanity.	 It	 was	 used	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	since	it	 is	such	a	common	collocation	that	no	other	word	can	be	present	in	it.	The	Committee	did	not	find	it	confusing	that	Art.	1	(2)	uses	the	words	“nation”	and	“people”	in	one	sentence	because	“nation”	expresses	a	certain—whether	state	or	non-state—entity,	while	“people”	 represents	 groups	 of	 people	 that	may	 but	 need	 not	 constitute	 one	 state	 or	 nation	(Cristescu,	1981,	p.	38).	The	term	“people”	was,	therefore,	not	unambiguous	in	the	Charter.	 It	was	used	with	the	knowledge	of	its	very	broad	scope	and	because	of	the	established	character	of	the	phrase,	not	in	an	attempt	to	clearly	identify	certain	groups	as	self-determining	units.	Therefore,	it	cannot	be	argued	that	it	would	cover,	for	example,	only	the	entire	population	of	sovereign	states.	This	is	evident	already	from	the	fact	that	it	is	used	in	the	Charter	also	in	relation	to	the	population	of	 colonies.	 Furthermore,	 if	 self-determination	 only	 applied	 to	 the	 population	 of	 an	 entire	state,	it	would	be	difficult	to	look	for	its	independent	meaning	and	justification	in	a	situation	where	the	Charter	protects,	pursuant	to	Art.	2	(4),	“political	 independence	of	states”.	Finally,	self-determination	of	peoples	as	a	political	concept,	as	formed	in	international	relations	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	and	upon	which	the	Charter	draws,	was	not	limited	to	the	entire	population	(Cassese,	1995,	p.	18;	Wrede,	1920,	p.	313-314).	At	the	same	time,	it	follows	from	 the	 latter	 that	 despite	 its	 most	 frequent	 use	 in	 relation	 to	 colonies	 and	 despite	 the	subsequent	 practice	 (see	 below),	 the	 term	 “people”	 (and,	 therefore,	 self-determination	 as	such)	 was	 not	 targeted	 at	 colonies	 as	 the	 pre-war	 self-determination	 undoubtedly	 went	beyond	 the	 colonial	 notions.	 Indeed,	 if	 the	 term	 “nation”	 was	 to	 include	 both	 states	 and	colonies	while	the	term	“people”	was	perceived	even	more	broadly,	 this	 indicates	a	possible	inclusion	of	non-colonial	non-state	groups.	This	 conclusion	 is	 further	 sustained	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Soviet	Union	 sought	 to	 include	self-determination	of	peoples	in	the	Charter.	That	initiative	was	certainly	influenced	by	efforts	to	weaken	colonial	powers	but	there	is	no	doubt	that	the	Soviet	doctrine	of	self-determination	of	 peoples	 had	 a	 broader	 scope	 (Cassese,	 1995,	 p.	 18).	 This	 is	 indirectly	 supported	 by	 the	preparatory	works	on	 the	adoption	of	 the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights.	Although	self-determination	 of	 nations	 did	 not	 make	 its	 way	 to	 that	 document,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	attempted	 at	 least	 to	 include	 the	 collective	 rights	 of	 minorities	 (Draft	 International	Declaration	 of	 Human	Rights,	 1948),	 arguing	 that	 cultural	 autonomy	was	 guaranteed	 to	 60	peoples	 and	 hundreds	 of	 nationalities	 in	 the	 USSR.	 As	 an	 USSR	 official	 also	 stated,	internationalism	may	be	achieved	 in	 two	ways:	 first,	by	respecting	 the	rights,	 independence	and	sovereignty	of	all	peoples,	which	was	allegedly	a	method	 followed	by	 the	Soviet	Union;	second,	 through	 assimilation	 of	 various	 peoples,	 which	was,	 however,	 a	method	 the	 Soviet	Union	rejected	(Schabas,	2013,	pp.	2837	et	seq.).		It	 is,	 therefore,	clear	that	the	Soviet	Union,	as	the	main	proponent	of	the	addition	to	the	Charter	of	the	principle	of	self-determination	of	peoples,	 interpreted	the	concept	of	“people”	
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similarly	 as	 the	 Coordination	 Committee	 perceived	 it.	 The	 declaration	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	official	 is	from	the	preparation	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	but	work	on	it	began	shortly	after	the	adoption	of	the	Charter	and	the	speech	of	the	Soviet	official	was	made	on	 27	November	1948.	 Nothing	 suggests	 that	 the	 Soviet	 perception	 of	 the	 term	 “people”	shifted	somehow	in	the	short	time	between	the	adoption	of	the	Charter	and	the	consideration	of	the	Universal	Declaration.	An	opposite	 interpretation,	based	on	 the	French	version	of	 the	Charter,	 can	be	 found	 in	the	 literature	 (Rodríguez-Santiago,	 2017,	 p.	 218).	 In	 that	 version,	 the	 word	 “people”	 (or	French	 “peuple”),	 as	 used	 in	 Art.	1	(2)	 is	 replaced	 by	 the	 word	 “population”	 in	 relation	 to	colonies	(for	example,	 in	Art.	73	and	76).	The	French	version	 thus	allegedly	reveals	 the	 true	meaning	 of	 self-determination,	 which	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 colonial	 or	 other	 groups	 of	 the	population	but	only	 to	 the	entire	population	of	 states	as	 the	bearers	of	 state	authority.	This	argument	 is	 somewhat	 weakened	 by	 the	 fact	 that,	 for	 example,	 the	 Spanish	 and	 Russian	versions	use	the	same	word	in	Art.	1	(2)	and	Art.	73	and	76—although	it	may	be	argued	that	the	ambiguity	of	several	versions	does	not	mean	that	the	language	version	that	eliminates	the	ambiguities	should	not	be	taken	into	account.		Pursuant	to	Art.	33	(4)	of	the	Vienna	Convention,	however,	differences	between	language	versions	should	be	removed	using	the	interpretative	methods	under	Art.	31	and	32.	Pursuant	to	Art.	31,	interpretation	of	terms	in	a	treaty	should	take	into	account	the	overall	context	and	any	 subsequent	practice	 in	 the	application	of	 the	 treaty	which	establishes	 the	agreement	of	the	 parties	 regarding	 its	 interpretation.	 The	 practice	 of	 states	 within	 UN	bodies	 suggests	 a	broader	sense	of	the	word	“people”	as	it	follows	from	the	English	or	Spanish	versions,	not	the	restrictive	 French	 wording.	 For	 example,	 General	 Assembly	 Resolution	 637	 of	16	December	1952	expressly	applied	the	principle	of	self-determination	pursuant	to	Art.	1	(2)	to	 the	 territory	 stipulated	 in	 Art.	73	 and	76	 of	 the	 Charter.	 The	 French	 version	 of	 that	resolution	 retained	 the	 original	 French	 terminology	 and	 used	 the	 term	 “populations”	 in	relation	to	colonies.	However,	it	is	clear	from	the	context	that	the	population	of	the	colonies	is	also	“people”	because	they	have	been	granted	the	right	of	peoples	to	self-determination.	This	practice	was	subsequently	reflected	 in	French	 terminology	as	well.	For	example,	 the	French	version	 of	 General	 Assembly	 Resolution	 1514	 of	 14	December	1960	 (and	 many	 others)	already	 use	 the	 term	 “peuples	 coloniaux”.	 It	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 this	 was	 a	 retroactive	amendment	 to	 the	 Charter	 as	 a	 result	 of	 developments	 in	 international	 law.	 However,	 this	practice	corresponds	to	the	texts	of	the	non-French	authentic	versions	and	to	the	records	of	the	preparatory	works	as	described	above.	It	follows	from	these	and	the	related	state	practice	that	 the	 concept	 of	 “people”	 was	 not	 clearly	 defined	 and	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 entire	population	of	sovereign	states	or	 to	 the	population	under	colonial	 rule.	That,	as	has	already	been	 said,	 corresponds	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 self-determination	 as	 a	 principle	 that	 has	 yet	 to	 be	translated	into	particular	rights.	After	the	word	“people”	it	is	necessary	to	comment	also	on	the	word	“self-determination”.	Here,	 it	 is	not	very	relevant	to	base	our	thoughts	on	dictionary	definitions,	and	there	are	no	problems	 among	 various	 language	 versions.	 It	 is	 not	 disputed	 that	 self-determination	 is	related	to	decision-making	about	oneself;	therefore,	it	is	assumed	that	the	entity	(people)	can	decide	or	at	 least	co-decide	on	its	own	future.	Accordingly,	the	International	Court	of	Justice	has	defined	self-determination	as	“the	need	to	pay	regard	to	the	freely	expressed	will	of	peoples”	(1975,	 para.	 59).	 The	 real	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 people’s	 self-determination	 can	 only	 be	carried	out	 through	 independence.	A	 look	at	 the	provisions	of	 the	Charter	does	not	 indicate	this.		
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In	addition	to	'self-determination',	the	Charter	uses	the	concepts	of	“self-government”	and	“independence”.	On	the	basis	of	the	same	thought	process	used	for	the	word	“people”,	 it	can	be	 stated	 that	 self-determination	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 independence	 or	 self-government.	Independence	 cannot	 be	 even	 considered	 the	 only	 possible	 way	 of	 self-determination.	 The	word	“independence”	is	used	twice	in	the	Charter;	in	the	aforementioned	Art.	2	(4)	(referring	to	 the	 threat	 for	 the	 political	 independence	 of	 a	 state)	 and	 especially	 in	 Art.	76,	 which	stipulates	 that	 one	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 trusteeship	 system	 is	 “to	 promote	 the	 political,	
economic,	 social,	 and	 educational	 advancement	 of	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 trust	 territories,	 and	
their	progressive	development	towards	self-government	or	independence	as	may	be	appropriate	
to	the	particular	circumstances	of	each	territory	and	its	peoples	and	the	freely	expressed	wishes	
of	the	peoples	concerned”.	If,	according	to	the	Charter,	there	is	a	principle	of	self-determination	of	 peoples	 (applicable,	 as	 shown,	 also	 to	 colonized	 peoples)	 but	 the	 task	 of	 the	 trusteeship	system	development	 towards	 self-government	or	 independence,	 independence	 could	not	be	the	only	possible	starting	point	for	self-determination.	Here	 is	 an	 interesting	 difference	 between	 Art.	73	 and	76.	 Art.	 73—which	 refers	 to	territories	under	the	administration	of	member	states—does	not	mention	independence	at	all,	nor	does	it	refer	to	Art.	1	of	the	Charter	as	does	Art.	76,	which	concerns	territories	under	the	administration	 of	 an	 international	 trusteeship	 system.	 Art.	73	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 phrase	 “full	measure	of	self-government”.	 In	Fastenrath’s	view,	there	is	a	certain	contradiction	of	Art.	73	with	 Art.	1	(2)	 and	 the	 principles	 of	 self-determination	 as	 territories	 under	 Art.	73	 are	allegedly	 denied	 (full)	 self-determination	 (2012,	 p.	 1830	 et	 seq.).	 However,	 as	 has	 already	been	 said,	 Art.	76	 did	 not	 establish	 independence	 as	 the	 only	 outcome.	 Therefore,	 if	 Art.	73	was	 contrary	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination,	 Art.	76	would	 be	 equally	 contradictory.	Since	these	are	the	only	provisions	of	the	Charter	that	can	be	directly	related	to	the	principle	of	self-determination,	in	accordance	with	Art.	31	of	the	Vienna	Convention,	self-determination	should	 be	 interpreted	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Art.	73	 and	76	 so	 as	 independence	 is	 not	 the	 only	result	 of	 that	 principle.	 An	 interpretation	 to	 the	 contrary	 would	 mean	 an	 internal	contradiction	of	the	Charter.	It	can	be	added	that	 the	 independence	of	previously	dependent	 territories	 is	such	a	key	issue	 and	 such	 a	 strong	 interference	with	 the	 rights	 and	obligations	 of	 states	 (at	 least	with	regard	 to	 territories	 under	 Art.	73)	 that	 it	 should	 be	 clearly	 defined,	 albeit	 merely	 as	 an	objective.	It	is,	for	that	matter,	a	principle	of	international	law	that	the	existence	of	states’	duties	or	waivers	of	rights	by	states	must	be	assessed	restrictively	(International	Court	of	Justice,	2005,	para.	 293;	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 1974,	 para.	 47).	 Therefore,	 since	 Art.	73	 does	 not	mention	independence,	we	should	depart	 from	the	fact	that	 independence	is	not	necessarily	enshrined	in	it	(and	thus	neither	in	the	principle	of	self-determination).	This	is	also	reflected	in	 the	 information	 from	 the	 San	 Francisco	 Conference,	which	 suggests	 that	 states	 found	 no	contradiction	between	Art.	73	and	Art.	1	(2)	because	they	did	not	associate	self-determination	with	 independence	(Fastenrath,	2012,	pp.	1830	et	seq.).	Reference	may	also	be	made	 to	 the	report	of	 the	 sixth	meeting	of	 the	First	Committee,	 according	 to	which	 the	principle	of	 self-determination	 corresponds	 to	 the	wishes	 and	wills	 of	 all	 peoples	but	 is	 consistent	with	 the	Charter’s	 objectives	 as	 long	 as	 it	 “implies	 self-governance,	 not	 independence”	 (The	 United	Nations	Conference	on	International	Organization,	1945).	It	is	true	that	the	above	is	to	some	extent	relativised	by	the	subsequent	practice	of	states	and	UN	bodies,	which	no	doubt	implies	that	the	objective	of	territorial	administration	under	Art.	73	 and	76	 (and	 hence	 with	 the	 projection	 of	 self-determination	 in	 relation	 to	 these	territories)	 has	 indeed	 become	 their	 independence.	 For	 example,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	aforementioned	 General	 Assembly	 Resolution	 1541	 (XV),	 the	 Charter,	 in	 its	 Art.	73,	
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introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 gradual	 shift	 towards	 a	 full	measure	of	 self-government,	which	can	be	achieved	in	three	ways:	the	creation	of	a	sovereign	independent	state,	free	association	with	an	independent	state	and	integration	into	another	independent	state.	The	choice	among	these	variants	should	be	based	on	the	freely	expressed	wishes	of	the	people.	Independence	as	an	 objective	 of	 territory	 administration	 under	 Art.	73	 and	76	 was	 also	 confirmed	 by	 the	International	Court	of	Justice	(1971,	para.	52).	However,	 contrary	 to	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 word	 “people”,	 this	 practice	 cannot	 be	regarded	 merely	 a	 clarification	 of	 the	 original	 meaning	 of	 the	 Charter.	 As	 shown	 above,	independence	 was	 not	 originally	 the	 objective	 of	 colonial	 territorial	 administration.	 It	 is,	therefore,	only	a	reflection	of	the	development	of	international	law	in	the	interpretation	of	the	treaty.	This	development,	 furthermore,	 does	not	 affect	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	principle	of	self-determination	in	general,	but	only	the	interpretation	of	the	self-determination	of	colonial	peoples.	In	relation	to	them,	there	is	no	doubt	that	self-determination	requires	independence.	However,	the	distinction	between	self-determination	and	independence	remains.		This	is	evidenced,	for	example,	by	recent	practice	in	relation	to	the	self-determination	of	indigenous	 peoples	 (see	 Anaya,	 2009,	 p.	 184).	 In	 2007,	 the	 General	 Assembly	 adopted	 a	resolution	accompanied	by	the	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	 Indigenous	Peoples	as	an	annex	(UNGA,	 Resolution	 61/295).	 In	 the	 latter,	 indigenous	 peoples	 were	 granted	 the	 status	 of	 a	people	 (which	 also	 confirms	 the	wider	meaning	 of	 the	 word	 above)	 with	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	(referring	to	the	principle	of	self-determination	under	the	Charter),	but	with	an	express	 exclusion	 of	 any	 impact	 on	 territorial	 integrity	 or	 political	 unity	 of	 states.	 The	Declaration	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Indigenous	 Peoples	 is	 not	 binding,	 but	 has	 been	 adopted	 by	143	states	(the	107th	plenary	session	of	the	General	Assembly,	2007),14	thus	presenting	their	views	on	the	applicability	of	the	principle	of	self-determination.	It	 follows	 from	 all	 of	 the	 above	 that	 the	 Charter	 included	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 of	 peoples	 without	 specifying	 who	 has	 the	 status	 of	 a	 people	 and	 how	specifically	 its	self-determination	should	be	achieved.	It	was	a	vague	principle	left	to	further	development.	In	different	contexts	and	in	relation	to	different	entities,	it	can	be	projected	into	different	forms	of	its	implementation.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	colonies	it	was	first	a	certain	degree	 of	 self-government,	 subsequently	 independence.	 In	 relation	 to	 indigenous	 peoples,	independence	 is,	 in	 contrast,	 strictly	 excluded.	 As	 mentioned	 at	 the	 beginning,	 self-determination	of	other	entities	is	the	subject	to	debate.	
	
Conclusions		The	 conclusions	 drawn	 in	 this	 article	make	 it	 possible	 to	 streamline	 these	 discussions.	Just	as	self-determination	 in	contemporary	 international	 law	is	based	on	the	UN	Charter,	 its	applicability	 in	 individual	 contexts	 should	 be	 based	 on	 the	 conclusions	 of	 this	 article.	 This	means	 taking	 into	 account	 that	 self-determination	 as	 a	 principle	 is	 not	a	 priori	 limited	 to	 a	clearly	 defined	 group	 of	 entities,	 nor	 does	 it	 assume	 that	 each	 people	 will	 achieve	independence	 as	 part	 of	 self-determination.	 The	 latter	 fact	 should	 allow	 for	 the	 full	development	of	self-determination	as	a	principle	supporting	the	right	of	persons	to	decide	for	themselves	as	the	main	obstacle	has	always	been	states’	fear	of	territorial	integrity	violation.15	
																																								 																				14	Other	states,	such	as	Australia,	stated	their	support	for	the	Declaration	later	(Australian	Human	Rights	Commission,	2009).		15	 A	 typical	 example	 are	 the	 aforementioned	 indigenous	 peoples,	 who	 have	 achieved	 explicit	 recognition	 of	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 only	when	 states	were	 provided	with	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	 right	 did	 not	 imply	 the	 right	 to	 independence.	 See	
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If	 it	 is	accepted	that	self-determination	is	not	identical	to	independence,	there	is	in	principle	no	 reason	 for	 not	 allowing	 various	 national	 minorities	 (Catalans,	 Québécois	 and	 others)	achieve	recognition	of	 the	right	to	self-determination.	This	 in	turn	will	enable	to	materialize	their	 self-determination	 for	 example	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 certain	 degree	 autonomy	 or	 self-government,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 indigenous	 peoples.	 Disputes	 between	 states	 and	 national	minorities	 would	 not	 cease	 from	 day	 to	 day	 but	 at	 least	 their	 possible	 international	 legal	framework	would	be	defined.		
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